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This paper examines the competitive dynamics in a standard-based industry through a 
historical examination of the U.S. home video industry. It analyzes how the Blu-ray 
technology wins the battle of the high definition DVD market over HD-DVD technology, by 
focusing on the aspects of the first-mover advantages, network effects. The analysis suggests 
that the success in the network-based industry partially support to traditional argument on 
first-mover advantages; they were important only to the point that the first mover takes 
advantages of the lead time to develop a network of complementary products. This study 
illustrates that building a network of complementary products and installed base should be 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
The ability of a firm to establish its technology as the standard is a critical 
determinant to its long-term success in a competitive market environment. Many well-known 
historical cases provide good examples of the importance of standards setting. One example 
is the case of the adoption of QWERTY typewriter keyboard (David 1985). The QWERTY 
format was originally developed by trial and error in the 1860s to reduce the tendency of type 
bars to clash and jam when keys were struck in rapid succession. Though the format was 
considered inferior to alternative designs, the skills of typists became a complementary 
product and consumers were locked in the QWERTY standard (Hill 1997). Even after the 
development of computer in which the clashing and jamming issues are not important factors 
in designing a keyboard, the QWERTY format continues to dominate the market as the main 
standard.  
Another example of the importance of standard is the decline of the Apple computer 
in the 1980s, frequently attributed to Apple’s reluctance to share its operating system with 
software developers. In comparison, the rise of Microsoft and Intel is attributed to their 
liberal policy of sharing the operating system, which has been used by over 90% of computer 
users until 1998 (Ramsey 1998). However, with the new design and architectural innovations 
of the Apple computer, the market share of the firm is on the rise. According to Wakabayashi 
(2008), Apple has steadily gained market share against PCs. In the June 2008 quarter, Apple 
accounted for 8.5 percent of U.S. computer shipments, a rise of 38 percent from a year 
earlier, which outpaced the overall U.S. computer market growth of 4.2 percent. The new 
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design and color of the Apple computer, which significantly stands out compare to other 
ordinary computers, attracted consumers and contributed to Apple’s recent success. 
However, in the U.S. home video market, the design of home video machines did not affect 
firms’ success in the past as none of the manufacturers’ machines look much different from 
each other.  
  In the U.S. home video market, there was a famous standards competition between 
VHS and Betamax (Beta) formats in the late 1970s. The Beta format was introduced in 1975 
by the Sony Corporation, and the VHS was introduced in 1976 by the JVC (Victor Company 
of Japan) supported by its parent company, Matsushita Electric. The VHS format became the 
standard in the VCR market, though Beta format was introduced earlier and was considered 
technically superior (Cusumano, Mylonadis, and Rosenbloom 1992). Recently, in the high 
definition DVD market, intensive standard war has been engaged between Sony-led Blu-ray 
technology and Toshiba-led HD-DVD technology, and the Blu-ray technology became the 
standard.  
The objective of this thesis is to examine the factors that affect the market dominance 
in the standard war, using the recent example of the competition between Blu-ray and HD-
DVD technologies in the home video market. Several studies have examined the theoretical 
and empirical analysis of the processes and outcomes of the standard-setting competition in 
some markets including the Beta and VHS technologies in home video player (Cusumano et 
al. 1992, Gallagher and Park 2002, Ohashi 2003, Park 2004). Due to the very recent 
resolution of the standard war in high definition video market in 2008, there is not enough 
empirical data to examine the factors that contributed the adoption of the Blu-ray technology. 
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This thesis instead relies on the previous experiences in similar industries to explore what 
key strategic issues determined the outcome in a standards-based industry in general and a 
high definition video market in particular. This thesis can provide some guideline for firms’ 
strategy in standards-based industries.  
This paper examines the history of the home video market standards competition 
between Beta and VHS in the 1970s. The main three theories that are used to analyze the 
previous Beta versus VHS standards competition and other standards competitions—are 
applied to the recent standard war between Blu-ray and HD-DVD. The three theories include 
the first-mover advantages, network effects, and architectural innovation. Firms’ patent data 
related to Blu-ray and HD-DVD are collected from the U.S. patent and trademark office and 
analyzed to describe firms’ interest in technology and their management strategies. Of 
particular interest are the patterns of publishing patents of major electronics firms before and 
after the high definition standards competition.  
This paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 establishes the theoretical 
background and the assumptions through various literatures. Section 3 describes the 
overview of the U.S. home video market. The analysis of the standard setting in high 
definition home video market is examined in section 4, with patent data. The conclusion 
related to the results to management recommendations, and future research perspectives is 
discussed in section 5.   
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Chapter 2  Literature Review 
 
Industry standard is a technology or format that is generally accepted by members of 
an industry. There exist several studies which investigate the factors that affect the survival 
of firms in standards-setting industries. Koski and Kretschmer (2005) explain that 
standardization accelerates the new technology entry and diffusion, although within 
standards competition triggers less aggressive price competition than between standards 
competition. Hill (1997) gives examples of companies in the industries where technological 
standards are important, such as Apple Computer, Ericsson, Iomaga, Intel, Microsoft, 
Qualcomm, and Sony. 
According to Arthur (1989), in markets where two or more incompatible increasing 
return technologies compete, small changes in the initial conditions either due to the result of 
chance or firms’ strategy may result in one technology’s gaining of a sufficient lead and 
becoming the de facto standard, with other competing technologies becoming locked out. 
Only first-movers are able to impact markets considerably from making small initial 
condition changes since the technologies are new. This undoubtedly shows the importance of 
becoming a first-mover. Several economists argue that this can occur even when the 
dominant technology is clearly inferior to other designs (Cooper and Schendel 1976, David 
1985, Hill 1997). 
The strategic options that a firm might adopt in order to establish its technology as a 
standard include patents licensing, strategic alliances, and diversification into complementary 
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product. These options can be classified into three main groups that affect the wining of 
standards competitions; the first-mover advantages, network effects, and architectural 
innovation.  
2.1 First-mover Advantages 
The concept of first-mover advantages initially emerged from anecdotal and empirical 
evidences which show that first movers’ competitive performance tend to be better than that 
of later entrants (Suarez and Lanzolla 2007). The pioneering research funded by the U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission in the 1970s show that, in both the prescription drug and cigarette 
product markets, first entrants tend to enjoy enduring performance advantages over later 
entrants. 
This concept of “first-mover advantage” have attracted lots of attention afterwards, 
and several theoretical explanations are suggested regarding why the first movers tend to 
earn “profits in excess of the cost of capital”, why they achieve a larger market share, or why 
they survive longer than competitors (Suarez and Lanzolla 2007).  
Deeds and Hill (1996) argue the importance of rapid development and introduction of 
new products, in order to gain early cash flows for greater financial independence, external 
visibility and legitimacy as soon as possible, and to increase the likelihood of survival.  
The first-mover advantages are defined in terms of the ability of pioneering firms to 
earn positive economic profits. Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) suggest that first-mover 
advantages arise endogenously within a multi-stage process. In the first stage, some 
asymmetry is generated, enabling one particular firm to gain a head start over rivals. This 
first-mover opportunity may occur because of the firm’s unique resources or foresight or 
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simply luck. Once this asymmetry is generated, a variety of mechanisms may enable the firm 
to utilize its position, which enhances the magnitude or durability of the first-movers’ profits. 
Lieberman (1988) emphasizes that the initial asymmetry is critical for first-mover advantages 
to arise.  
In service sectors, Tufano (1989) studies how investment banks are compensated for 
their investments in developing new products, and found that there were early mover 
advantages in the form of lower costs of trading, underwriting, and marketing in financial 
services. Investment banks that create new products do not charge higher prices in the short 
period of ‘monopoly’ before imitative products appear. Consequently, banks capture a larger 
share of underwritings with innovations than with imitative products. Nehrt (1998) studies 
the maintainability of first mover advantages when environmental regulations differ between 
countries. Also, Suarez and Lanzolla (2007) study how the pace of market evolution and 
technology evolution potentially enables or disables first mover advantage. The ability to 
gain first-mover advantages is true in any industries where the relative effectiveness of patent 
protection leads to patent races in which a “winner takes all” scenario exists (Gilbert and 
Newbery 1982).  
2.1.1 Factors that affect the first mover advantages 
Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) show that first-mover advantages generally arise 
from three primary sources: technology leadership, pre-emption of assets, and buyer 
switching costs. First-movers can gain advantage through maintaining leadership in 
technology. Also, the first-mover firm may gain advantage by pre-empting rivals in getting 
hold of scarce assets. Here, the first-mover gains advantage by controlling the assets that 
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already exist, rather than those created by the firm through development of new technology. 
Moreover, first-mover advantages may also arise from buyer switching costs. With switching 
costs, late entrants must invest extra resources to lure customers away from the first-mover 
firm. 
Other studies stress the importance of path dependence in the evolution of 
technologies, (Arthur 1989, Ruttan 1997). Path dependence implies that future success is to a 
large extent dependent on past achievements, which results in increasing returns from 
following a particular path. Path dependence may then lead to market entrenchment if a 
variant of new technology, produced by an innovator, leads to a cumulative advantage 
(increasing returns) over later entrants. It has been argued that this could preclude entry even 
when the newer versions of a technology are superior, due to the high switching costs 
(Agarwal and Gort 2001). The classic example of first-mover advantages caused by high 
switching costs is the QWERTY format standard.  
2.1.2 Factors that are related to first mover disadvantages 
The first-mover disadvantages, or second-mover advantages, are those advantages 
enjoyed by late-mover firms. Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) show late-movers may 
benefit from the first movers’ experiences: the ability to ‘free-ride’ on first-movers’ 
investments, resolution of technological and market uncertainty, technological discontinuities 
that provide ‘gate-ways’ for new entry, and various types of ‘incumbent inertia’ that make it 
difficult for the incumbent to adapt to environmental change. 
Late-movers may be able to ‘free-ride’ on a pioneering firm’s investments in a 
number of areas, including R&D, buyer education, and infrastructure development. Late-
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movers can gain advantage through resolution of market or technological uncertainty. 
Werner-felt and Karnani (1987) studied the effects of uncertainty on the attractiveness of 
early versus late market entry. Entry in an uncertain market obviously involves a high degree 
of risk. They argue that early entry is more attractive when the firm can influence the way 
that uncertainty is removed or reduced at least. Since the replacement technology often 
appears while the old technology is still growing, it may be difficult for an entrant to perceive 
the threat and take ample preventative steps. Weakness of the first-mover advantage is often 
enhanced by ‘incumbent inertia’. Locked-into a specific set of fixed assets, the firm may be 
reluctant to increase existing product lines, or become organizationally inflexible (Lieberman 
and Montgomery 1988). 
Christensen et al. (1998) shows that firms that entered many years before, in the stage 
of the industry’s development characterized by broader variety in product architecture and 
low volume-per-model manufacturing, faced a higher probability of failure. This suggests 
that the capabilities and cultures they developed in the competitive environment might not 
have equipped them well for the competition that characterizes the industry after the 
dominant design emerged. They show that in the rigid disk drive industry, entry strategies 
that entail market risk (entering an emerging market with proven component technology) 
may be less risky than strategies that entail technological risk (entering an established market 




2.2 Network Effects 
In modern industries such as computer, information and consumer electronic 
technologies, a consumer’s benefit of consuming a product or a firm’s success of introducing 
a new product depends on the number of people who purchased compatible products (called 
“network effect”). Katz and Shapiro (1985) distinguish this externality between direct and 
indirect network effects.1  Direct network effect arises where there is a direct physical effect 
of the number of purchasers on the quality of the product, and a typical example is telephone 
network in which the value of telephone directly depends on the number of other consumers 
(network size) who have joined the network.2  For indirect network effect, the value of a 
product does not depend directly on the physical effect but indirectly on the availability of 
complementary products. For example, the size of installed base of hardware (i.e., 
cumulative sale of hardware products) affects software developers’ incentive to introduce 
new software varieties that are compatible with the hardware product.   
Many products have little or no value in isolation, but generate value when combined 
with others (Economides 1996). Examples include: camera bodies and lenses, which together 
provide photographic services; home video components and programming, which together 
provide entertainment services. Hence, the expected utility of the primary product, and thus 
its sales, increases as more complements become available; in turn, this availability of 
complements depends on the installed base of the primary product (Stremersch et al. 2007). 
Examples given are products that are strongly complementary, although they need not be 
                                                     
1
 They also consider another type of externality arisen from durable goods, in which the quality and availability 
of post-purchase service depends on the size of network.  
2
 Other analyses of direct network effect include computer software Gandal (1994) and automated teller 
machines Saloner and Shepherd (1995). 
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consumed in fixed proportions (Katz and Shapiro 1994). In summary, the amount of software 
that is available for a certain technology has a positive influence on the utility of the entire 
hardware-software system to the consumer (Church and Gandal 1992), drawing more new 
customers to adopt the new hardware and thus increasing hardware sales and the installed 
base of hardware. In turn, the hardware installed base positively affects software companies’ 
decisions to make software titles available (Gandal 2002). 
Some authors have argued that growth in software availability may precede growth of 
hardware sales (Srinivasan et al. 2004). Church and Gandal (1992) claim that software 
availability needs to achieve a critical mass for hardware to become a viable alternative and 
for hardware sales to take off. The reason is that consumers need a sign of sufficient software 
availability before they adopt the hardware. Moreover, software companies may invest in 
software provision before any marked hardware sales occur. For example, Microsoft invested 
in the CD-ROM long before any significant sales of CD-ROM hardware occurred. Because 
the CD-ROM was the first mass-market high-capacity medium that might prove useful in 
copyright protection, Microsoft envisioned the dramatic advantages it might have for 
software delivery and installation (Stremersch et al. 2007). Also, some theoretical work on 
network externality has typically employed a game-theoretic approach to analyze competitive 
behaviour between incompatible technologies with different installed bases (Katz and 
Shapiro 1986, Farrell and Saloner 1986). 
Empirical investigations on network externality, on the other hand, have focused on 
demonstrating direct and indirect network effects in a variety of industries (Gandal et al. 
1999). These studies find that after adjusting for differences in quality, the value of a product 
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in these categories increases as the installed base or availability of complementary products 
increases (Basu et al. 2003). 
2.2.1 Direct Network Externality 
In case of direct network effects it is relatively uncontroversial that they can give rise 
to a network, or adoption, externality. Individuals when they join a network characterized by 
direct network effects do so, on the basis of their private benefits and do not take into account 
that others on the network are also made better off by their decision to join (Church, Gandal 
and Krause 2008).  
Figure 1 shows a feature in a simple star telephone network. A phone call from B to E 
is composed of BS and SE. S is defined as switching services in the figure. Networks where 
these services are distinct are names ‘two-way’ networks in Economides and White (1994). 
When BS and SE are identical it is called ‘one-way’ network. It is critical that the 
relationship in both one-way and two-way networks is the complementarity between the 
pieces of the network. This critical economic relationship is also often observed between 
different classes of goods in non-network industries. Economides and White (1994) point out 
that a pair of vertically related industries is formally equivalent to a one-way network. 
Despite the importance of the direct network externality, it is not likely to play a 
crucial role in setting the standards in the high definition standards competition. As noted, the 
value of direct network is attained from an immediate result of other users adopting the same 
system; in the home video market, consumers do not get direct benefit from adopting the 
same system. In contrast, direct network externality is more pervasive in information and 
network technologies such as facsimile, telephone, ATM, and internet industries. 
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2.2.2 Indirect Network Externality 
Theoretical work on indirect network externality has modeled the positive effect of 
the availability and variety of compatible complementary products on the valuation of a 
hardware product. The hardware-software relationship has also been extended to service 
industry, where, for instance, the existence of an auto-servicing network or a network of 
refueling franchises increases the value of the product (Basu et al. 2003). Indirect network 
externalities are gaining economic significance in technology markets, because hardware and 
software are typically provided by independent firms, and both sets of firms have an 
incentive to free-ride on each others’ demand creation efforts (Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 
1999). 
Historically, indirect network externalities have influenced the outcome of technology 
competition in many markets, including AM stereo, color television, videocassette recorders, 
CD players, and personal computers. More recently, as analog technologies gave way to 
digital technologies that require new software, indirect network externalities played an 
important role in the evolution of a wide range of technology markets (Basu et al. 2003). 
Empirical research on indirect network externality has focused primarily on the 
relationship between software availability and hardware sales. Bayus (1987) estimates a 
model for CD sales as a function of CD players, as well as others factors such as consumer 
awareness and purchase intentions. Gupta et al. (1999) have demonstrated the need for 
incorporating indirect network externality effects in forecasting the demand of HDTV, which 
depends on the availability of digital programming. Specifically, these authors show that 
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ignoring the indirect network externality can introduce a significant bias in predicted sales of 
HDTV (Basu et al. 2003).  
Stremersch et al. (2007) empirically examine whether software availability leads 
hardware sales, or vice versa. Business analysts and academics have casually observed that a 
critical mass of software titles is required for hardware sales to take off, where it is the point 
of transition between the introduction stage and the growth stage of a growth curve. 
Furthermore, when the network effect is indirect, consumption benefits do not depend 
directly on the size of the network (the total number of consumers who purchase compatible 
products) per se. Rather individuals care about the decisions of others because of the effect 
that has on the incentive for the provision of complementary products. It is not only restricted 
to consumer electronics which is the most common example.  
As mentioned, indirect network effects also give rise to a problem popularly called 
“chicken-and-egg” paradox; that is, consumers wait to adopt the hardware until enough 
software is available, and software manufacturers delay releasing software until enough 
consumers have adopted the hardware (Gupta et al. 1999). A recent example is the high-
definition television (HDTV) market. The expected utility of HDTV sets to consumers (and 
thus HDTV set sales) increases as more HD broadcasting becomes available. Conversely, 
broadcasters will make more HD broadcasting available as the number of consumers who 
own HDTV sets increases. For HDTV to succeed, this chicken-and-egg paradox must be 
resolved (Gandal 2002). In other words, when hardware and software products are supplied 
by different sets of firms, and when hardware manufacturers rely on software firms to supply 
software (Cusumano et al. 1992). The chicken-and-egg problem arises because hardware 
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firms want software firms to spur sales of new hardware products by offering a wide 
selection of software for the new products, but software firms in turn want to wait until the 
new hardware products have achieved significant market penetration, before committing to 
the new hardware platforms. Neither the hardware firms nor the software firms want to move 
first to invest in market creation (Gupta et al. 1999). 
Any industries where network effect is vital, the market pose challenges for 
coordination among firms-and sometimes consumers as well. A firm may gain little by 
introducing a new video format, such as in this paper HD-DVD, unless programming will be 
available to play on that format. Naturally, issues of coordinating investment arise in any 
market; for example, firms in an industry have to reach the right level of capacity (Katz and 
Shapiro 1994). 
 
2.3 Architectural Innovation 
The distinction between refining and improving an existing design and introducing a 
new concept that departs in a significant way from past practice is one of the central notions 
in the existing literature on technical innovation (Morse and Moch 1977). Incremental 
innovation introduces relatively minor changes to the existing product, exploits the potential 
of the established design, and often reinforces the dominance of established firms. Radical 
innovation, in contrast, is based on a different set of engineering and scientific principles and 
often opens up whole new markets and potential applications (Fixson and Park 2008, 
Henderson and Clark 1990). 
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The distinction between radical and incremental innovation has produced important 
insights, but it is fundamentally incomplete. Clark (1987) showed that there is growing 
evidence that there are numerous technical innovations that involve apparently modest 
changes to the existing technology but that have quite dramatic competitive consequences. 
One of the most well known examples of architectural innovation is the case of 
Xerox, the pioneer of plain-paper copiers. Xerox lost half of its market share and suffered 
serious financial problems due to lack of acknowledging the market appropriately. The 
competitors` copiers were much smaller and reliable; nevertheless, the new products only 
needed little engineering knowledge.  
One stream of research has focused on firms’ abilities to confront technological 
change as a primary determinant of survival. While the findings of these researchers have 
sometimes seemed disjointed and even at odds with one another, some integrative studies 
have recently emerged that suggest how technological, cultural, managerial, and competitive 





Chapter 3  Industry Overview 
 
3.1 Previous Standards Competitions 
Format competitions have been around for centuries: Thomas Edison favored 
phonograph cylinders but lost out to discs. The most famous case was the standards 
competition between VHS and Beta video-cassette formats in the home video market which 
started in the late 1970s and ended in the 1980s (Economist[A] 2007). Although there have 
been three major generations (VCR, DVD, and HD-DVD) in the evolution of the home video 
market, after the first standard-based competition, another competition between Blu-ray and 
HD-DVD had occurred without learning the lesson of hardship from the first competition 
between Beta and VHS.  
Even with firms’ willingness on a common standard before going to market, 
negotiations proved often difficult, since companies tend to have interests in various aspects 
of a product even if it may be a similar functioning product, in this case, Blu-ray and HD-
DVD. It is obvious that companies will lean towards to developing a product which costs the 
least, hence yielding the most profit. What they are capable of producing is always taken into 
consideration and, therefore, pursuing different goals among each other in the same industry 
is not a surprise. 
This is where the historical analysis of the U.S. home video industry begins. As noted 
above, there has been three major distinctive generations in the evolution of home video 
electronics. The last one between Blu-ray and HD-DVD is analyzed in the paper. Although 
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each generation has unique aspects, there are a few general themes in the home video market 
that are consistent of across generations. 
 
a) Capacity of the recording media. Between Beta and VHS, the length of the tape played an 
important role. Similarly for HD-DVD, the capacity of the disc was important for the quality 
of the picture.  
b) Home video machines were first introduced in Japan about a year earlier than in the U.S. 
market. However, success in Japan does not appear to have influenced the outcome in the 
U.S. market. For example, Beta appeared to be successful in Japan but VHS gained a huge 
success in VHS with different strategy.  
c) Profit margins on software, historically video cassettes, but more recently on discs, have 
been higher than on the hardware. 
d) Despite their common ancestry and technical similarities two machines competing against 
each other were always incompatible. 
e) Three theories—first-mover advantage, network effects, architectural innovation—are 
mainly used to explain the result of standards competition.  
 
Appendix A summarizes the high definition home video market chronology according to 




3.1.1 The First Generation 
The Beta format was the first compact, inexpensive, reliable, and easy-to use VCR, 
and it accounted for the majority of VCR production during 1975-77 and enjoyed steadily 
increasing sales until 1985. Nonetheless, it fell behind the VHS in market share during 1978 
and steadily lost share thereafter. Several theories can be applied to explain Beta’s loss 
against VCR. However, in particular, failing to utilize architectural innovation and network 
effects are the main reasons of Beta’s loss. Unlike the VHS, Beta could not record for the full 
three hours needed to cover a baseball game, and Beta’s lacking support in prerecorded tapes 
resulted in consumers not being able to find the movie titles they want easily at local rental 
store. Sony matched most of these moves but with a lag and with less effect. In subsequent 
years, the greater abundance of VHS tapes gave consumers greater incentives to choose VHS 
players, which then led tape distributors to stock more VHS tapes, in a reinforcing pattern 
(Cusumano et al. 1992). There are many studies on both management and economics which 
highlight the strategic challenges that can explain the case of Beta and VHS (Benner and 
Tushman 2003, Cusumano et al. 1992, Lieberman and Montgomery 1998).  
Moreover, unlike the CD-player, which was merely a better record-player, the VCR 
replaced no other household gadget. The only video recorders at the time were huge Ampex 
reel-to-reel machines used by television stations to rebroadcast live shows in later time zones. 
Evidence of sales showed that manufacturers who tried selling play-only VCRs did not sell 
many machines. Sales of play-only VCRs were low, indicating that the ability to record was 
crucial. Although, the Beta lost out unlike the VHS machine, it could not record for the full 
three hours needed to cover a baseball game (Economist[B] 2007). 
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3.1.2 The Second Generation 
For the second generation format standards competition of the home video market, 
several companies were also involved. Sony and Philips proposed a new technology called 
Multi Media Compact Disc (MMCD), while Toshiba and its allies pushed a rival standard 
called Super Density (SD) compact disc. After much power struggle, a standards competition 
was averted when Hollywood demanded a single format. Hence the industry managed, in 
1995, to agree on a common format that was a compromise between two rival proposals. 
Sony compromised, and the result was the Digital Versatile Disc (DVD), which is very 
similar to SD but borrowed some elements from MMCD (Economist[C] 2004). Since the 
format for DVD was based more on Toshiba’s technology, rather than the rival format 
devised by Sony, it is seen as Toshiba’s success. 
 
3.2 High Definition Standards Competition 
3.2.1 Hardware 
The latest standard-based competition was between Blu-ray and High-Definition 
Digital Versatile Disc (HD-DVD). The appearance of the high-definition video standards 
competition evolved as two major Japanese companies, Sony and Toshiba, started to develop 
their own technologies. As a mean of distributing high-definition video, neither Blu-ray nor 
HD DVD is unique. Both offer more convenient ways of delivering high-definition video to 
television sets, and both provide more capacity to the existing DVD (Economist[B] 2007). 
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The standards competition for high definition differs from the first generation of home video 
format. When VCR was introduced decades ago, consumers were anxious to buy these 
machines which would allow them to record television shows off the air for the first time 
(i.e., “time-shifting”) as it was for playing videos in their household. The first VCRs were 
unique and attracted all the consumers, unlike the later ones (Economist[B] 2007).  
Also, similar to previous standards competitions, the high-definition standards 
competition can be traced back to 2000 when companies began experimenting with using 
new blue lasers in optical disc systems (PCWorld 2008). Many Hollywood studios backed 
Sony’s Blu-ray, because of its larger capacity. Nonetheless, Toshiba, which had spent large 
sums developing its HD-DVD format, refused to give in (Economist[A] 2007). Hence, what 
started in 2000 as technical research became a battle between the world's largest electronics 
companies and movie studios, with the consumer caught in the middle (PCWorld 2008). 
As mentioned, the two new formats rely on blue lasers, which can discern finer 
details than the red lasers used in DVD players, to squeeze more data on to each disc. This 
capacity can be used in two ways: to boost quality, by providing a more detailed “high 
definition” picture, or to increase quantity, enabling more footage (at DVD quality) to fit on a 
single disc (Economist[C] 2004). Because the wavelength of blue light is shorter than that of 
the red lasers used in DVD, less physical space is needed to record each bit of data. As a 
result, more information can be recorded on a DVD-sized disc. This extra space was needed 
to store the new high-definition video and TV services that were starting to be 
commercialized around that time (PCWorld 2008). 
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Moreover, whoever wins the standards competition will profit handsomely from the 
royalties for the technology; this is why the two parties are trying their best to win. In the 
HD-DVD standards competition, around 70 companies have contributed intellectual property 
to Blu-ray, and slightly fewer to HD-DVD. The licensing fee for Blu-ray Disc is significant 
profit for Sony. Player makers pay US$20,000 to license Blu-ray while the content-protection 
system license carries a US$120,000 annual fee and additional charge of US$0.10 per player. 
Media makers pay US$8,000 annually and US$0.02 per disc for the copy protection system 
(Blu-ray Disc Association License Office 2008). HD-DVD’s royalty information is not 
available as Toshiba halted production of HD-DVD players. However, according to Nikkei 
Business Daily, the high-definition standards war cost Toshiba approximately $986 million. 
3.2.2 Software 
Hollywood was the most influential in setting the new standards for both HD-DVD 
and DVD. Recently Blu-ray has won the standards competition, even though the discs are 
slightly more expensive to produce and the players cost more. That is because it has broader 
industry support, including the backing of four of the biggest Hollywood studios. And with 
recent Blockbuster’s decision, Blu-ray for the home video market is the winner in the high-
definition market (Economist[A] 2007). Money was an issue in having support of Hollywood 
studios. Toshiba gave Paramount and DreamWorks Animation a combined $150 million in 
financial incentives for their business and it also offered to pay Warner Brothers substantial 
incentives to come down on its side; although, exact figure is unknown, it is believed that 
Sony offered even higher than Toshiba (Barnes 2008). 
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However, it is possible that, despite Blockbuster’s decision, both video formats—Blu-
ray and HD DVD—will coexist for some time. With its arm-lock on the consumer-
electronics industry, the Blu-ray alliance (including Philips, Samsung, LG, Pioneer and 
Matsushita as well as Sony) is more likely to succeed in the living room. In turn, the HD-
DVD group, with its extensive background in computing (members include Intel, Microsoft, 
and NEC), can expect a greater share of the computer market (Economist[B] 2007). 
One can ask if the history will repeat itself every time a new technology is introduced 
in the home video market. When VCR was first introduced, the Beta machine may have been 
technically superior to its VHS rival, but it was a dead-end design. By contrast, the VHS 
machine had a flexible concept that could be continually refined. Within a couple of years, 
Sony’s Beta technology had been trounced—and, shortly thereafter, the machines were 
collector’s items. Thus, far the story of VHS is similar to that of Blu-ray, but here the 




Chapter 4 Theoretical Analysis 
 
4.1 First-mover Advantages  
If a firm sees first-mover advantages in a standards based market, the firm can then 
decide whether to invest resources in searching for first-mover opportunities or wait for less 
risky second-mover advantages to come. Moreover, when a specific first-mover opportunity 
arises, managers must decide how to exploit it. Cusumano et al. (1992) shows that Sony, for 
example, aggressively pursues first-mover advantages from new product innovation, and its 
rival, Matsushita, generally lets Sony and others innovate; Matsushita then takes a position 
based on its manufacturing and marketing capabilities. Matsushita invests in R&D to be 
ready to enter the market when it begins rapid growth, but the firm will not launch new 
products until others have tested the market. Sony is again the first-mover in the high 
definition home video competition, and Toshiba imitates what Matsushita has done, became 
the second-mover. Sony announced its development of Blu-ray at Japan’s Ceatec show in 
2000, and Toshiba announced its plan for future generation home video player in 2002. The 
choice between the two strategies (becoming the first-mover or second-mover) depends on 
the firm’s specific characteristics and skills. Sony is well known for its excellent 
entrepreneurial vision and new product R&D (examples include Walkman, remote control, 
etc) and tends to find first-mover advantages attractive, whereas Toshiba or Matsushita, firms 




There certainly are more than two firms competing in the home video competition, and one 
can ask when is the point that a firm is considered as a second mover upon entry to the 
market. Gort and Klepper (1982)’s analysis can be generalized to separate the stages in the 
product cycle to distinguish the stage prior to second-movers’ entry. The model is not 
empirically tested because the necessary data are hard to obtain for the study period.  
To distinguish between the first-mover, Blu-ray, returns interval and start of HD-
DVD entry, the second-mover, data on annual net entry rates for a particular product is 
needed. To determine the cutoff year for the first-mover returns interval, the series need to be 
partitioned into three categories. The first and third categories should contain years in which 
the net entry rate reflect the first-mover returns interval and start of the second-mover entry. 
The net entry rates of the T consecutive “in-between” years of the second category are 
labeled , , … ,  . To choose an optimal dividing year j such that observations 
, , … ,  are classified in the first-mover returns interval and , , … , are 
classified in start of the second-mover entry. This can be accomplished by using a three-step 
procedure studied in Agarwal and Gort (2001).  
 
Step 1. For each j=1, 2, …, T, compute 
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 where  is net entry rates of the T consecutive ``in-between`` years  
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where and  represent the mean rate of net entry in categories 1 and 2. If there 
were no values of j satisfying the above equation, then all observations can be classified in 
the first-mover returns interval if |	
 − | ≤ |	
 − | and in start of the second-
mover entry otherwise. 
Step 3. If there are multiple values of j satisfying (2), then we selected the value of j 




 Step 2 requires that the mean of the observations classified in each of the two stages 
is closer to the sample mean of the observations initially classified in those stages than in the 
alternative stage. Step 3 ensures that, among the classifications that would satisfy step 2, the 
classification that is chosen maximizes the difference between the means of the points 
classified in the two alternative stages. 
Also, Bohlmann et al. (2002) provides theoretical and empirical evidence that first-
mover advantages are difficult to sustain in product categories with high “vintage effects”-
that is, where product quality significantly improves over time. Blu-ray and HD-DVD, both 
formats are already superior; hence, both formats are hard to be significantly improved over a 
short period of time. Consequently, following Bohlmann et al. (2002)’s analysis, it is not 
difficult for Sony to sustain the first-mover advantages. Similarly, another study conducted 
by Christensen et al. (1998) finds that, in the fast-changing rigid disk drive industry, “the 
notion of first mover advantage is not applicable”. Because first-mover firms faced a higher 
probability of failure in rigid disk drive industry, and this suggests that the capabilities and 
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cultures they developed in that competitive environment might not have equipped them well 
for the competition that characterized the industry after the dominant design emerged. 
When consumers perceive “technological uncertainty”, which is the case of 
committing on either Blu-ray or HD-DVD, consumers tend not to commit themselves to 
product-specific learning (Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989). This phenomenon is particularly 
relevant for experience goods, such as Blu-ray and HD-DVD, that can be evaluated only after 
purchase (Nelson 1980) and for standards competition situations in which hardware firms of 
two or more incompatible technologies compete for market dominance (Kalish and Lilien 
1986). 
The high definition standards competition resembles the VCR standards competition. 
In the same way as in the first standards competition, Sony’s Blu-ray technology is superior 
to Toshiba’s HD-DVD. Appendix B summarizes the two generations of home video 
technologies and other related information. The first generation technology is omitted since 
papers published regarding the first generation are abundant, and the technology is much 
different from the third generation; consequently, the comparison is not as useful between the 
first and the third. Both HD formats have same level of resolution and audio soundtracks. 
However, Blu-ray has bigger disc capacity; therefore, Blu-ray has longer recording time. 
Blu-ray also started with more hardware firms’ support and it still was the case in 2008 (Blu-
ray Disc Association 2008). Studio support was balanced between the two formats until 
2008; however, the balance tipped towards Blu-ray in 2008. This is discussed in the next 




Although the high definition standards competition has similar aspects compare to the 
first one, Sony learned from its mistake of not having an alliance of hardware firms 
supporting its technology, and took the right steps to succeed in this competition by forming 
an alliance with major electronics hardware firms and software firms (such as Hollywood 
studios). 
Technology leadership is one of factors that make first-mover advantages to arise. 
Hence, when a specific first-mover opportunity arises, managers must decide whether and 
how to exploit it. As mentioned, Sony aggressively pursues first-mover advantages from new 
product innovation. Sony’s inspiration of leadership in technology is apparent from the past 
generations of home video market. Investment in innovation is driven by expectation of 
transitory monopoly returns that innovations are supposed to yield. There have always been 
two strategies for protecting these monopoly returns: the first relies on patents; the second, 
on developing innovations in secrecy and getting to the market first (Agarwal and Gort 
2001). The nature of electronics industry does not allow a firm to develop innovations in 
secrecy as a result Sony definitely relies on patents.  
The high definition home video technology is considered as a rapid technology 
evolution although ordinary consumers cannot see much difference. According to Suarez and 
Lanzolla (2007), rapid technology evolution also influences the effectiveness of patents and 
other forms of intellectual property protection. The economics literature on patenting has 
shown that a firm’s ability to protect its underlying product technology varies across 
industries. It is generally recognized that competitors typically gain access to detailed 
information on the product within a year of development. Also, empirical evidence suggests 
 
 28 
that about 60 percent of successful innovations are imitated within four years (Mansfield et 
al. 1991). In the high definition home video competition, various firms have contributed 
intellectual property to both Blu-ray and HD-DVD. Table 1 and 2 show the number of 
patents filed for both Blu-ray and HD-DVD between year 2000 and 2007. It is apparent that 
the number of patents filed outnumbered those for Blu-ray, and this a good indication of 
firms favoring and supporting Blu-ray format over HD-DVD, since issuing patents in 
particular technology undoubtedly involves significant amount of money. 
Suarez and Lanzolla (2007) discuss a fast pace of technology evolution may give 
latecomers plenty of opportunities to “invent around” a patent and come up with improved 
products that do not necessarily infringe on patent rights. In the high definition competition, 
two electronics firms, Sony and Toshiba developed the core technologies for high definition 
machines; however, three other big electronics firms filed more patents that are related to the 
two core technologies. More number of the core technology related patents filed by firms 
other than Sony and Toshiba, would bring a higher possibility of coming up with improved 
products that do not need the core technology. 
Tables 3 and 4 show the firms other than Sony and Toshiba filed more patents. 
However, Sony and Toshiba were expected to profit handsomely from the royalties for the 
core technology for at least some time; this can be the reason that the two parties tried their 
best to win. HD-DVD royalty information is not known due to its loss; however, Toshiba 
would have made similar profit if Toshiba won the competition (Royalty information given 
in section 3.2.1). 
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In addition, first-movers may attempt to deter entry of late entrants through strategies 
of spatial pre-emption. As described in Lieberman and Montgomery (1988), pre-emptable 
‘space’ can be interpreted broadly to include not only geographic space, but also shelf space.  
Sony launched Blu-ray player ahead of Toshiba which put Sony to a better situation to 
establish positions in geographic or shelf space. However, Sony did not gain first-mover 
advantages because of its high-price of the player, which was $3,815 at the time it was first 
introduced in 2003. The price of the player was undoubtedly not an accessible price for 
ordinary customers to buy a home video machine. This prevented one of the major factors, 
pre-emption of assets, for first-mover advantages to arise; hence, buyer switching cost did 
not incur as well. Since the buyer switching cost did not incur, the late entrants did not have 
to worry about investing extra resources to lure customers away from the first-mover firm. 
The following year Toshiba unveiled its HD-DVD player at CES. Sony further worked hard 
to get other hardware firms on its side and had HP and Dell join the Blu-ray Disc group in 
2004. As Hollywood studios were divided into two groups supporting either format, Sony 
and Toshiba had discussions about having one format in 2005 but they did not work out well. 
Not having successful discussions in the high definition format urged Toshiba to launch the 
world’s first HD-DVD player at the price of $936 in 2006. Between Sony Blu-ray player’s 
introduction date and Toshiba HD-DVD player’s launching date, the market uncertainty for 
the high definition industry was at least reduced by gathering the Hollywood studios’ and 
other hardware firms’ support for the high definition technologies. Also, the price of HD-
DVD player was much more accessible (approximately one fourth of Blu-ray player’s price) 
to customers comparing to the price of Blu-ray. With the help of lower priced high definition 
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player, Toshiba sold more players than the Blu-ray introduced three years ahead (relevant 
data available in Appendix A). Sony instead, packed PlayStation 3 with Blu-ray Disc drive 
without increasing the price of the game console, which was other way of lowering the cost 
of purchasing a Blu-ray player. 
The late-mover, Toshiba, enjoyed the late-mover’s advantages. Sony provided some 
clue of the market uncertainty to Toshiba by launching the Blu-ray player ahead of HD-
DVD. The price of HD-DVD player was much less than the Blu-ray player and more 
customers were able to buy the player, showing Toshiba’s attempt to incur buyer’s switching 
cost. Despite of having late-mover advantages, Toshiba was not able to offset the result of 
network effects favoring Sony, which caused the competition to end. Network effects are 
discussed more in detail in the next section. 
First –mover advantages may also arise from buyer switching costs. Switching costs 
usually arise from the buyer’s investments in purchasing seller’s product or its transaction 
cost. Once the buyer adapt to characteristics of the first mover-product, Blu-ray, and its 
complimentary goods, then the buyer would find it costly to switch to other technology. 
However, all of this did not happen because of the unattractive high Blu-ray player price; this 
resulted in only few early adaptors to purchase the new technology machine. Consequently, 
buyer switching cost did not incur. 
Also, as noted in the literature review, path dependence is another factor for the first-
mover advantages to arise. However, this factor was not applicable to the winning of Sony’s 
high definition competition. Sony lost out to Victor Company of Japan (JVC) in the first U.S. 
home video competition (Toshiba was not considered as the core technology competitor); 
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therefore, this result did not benefit not only Sony nor Toshiba to gain first-mover 
advantages.  
 
4.2 Network Effects  
A situation in which consumer coordination is vital arises when consumers must 
choose durable hardware, as when they purchase a device to play a new format of pre-
recorded movie. In making such a choice, each consumer will have to form expectations 
about the availability of software for either Blu-ray or HD-DVD formats. In the presence of 
economies of scale in the production of software, the availability of software will depend on 
what other consumers do, giving rise to positive-feedback effects (Stremersch et al. 2007).  
Therefore, the actions of hardware firms indirectly impact the decisions of software firms 
through the effect of these actions on consumer demand for the whole product. Conversely, 
the actions of software firms indirectly impact the decisions of hardware firms through the 
impact of these actions on consumer demand for the whole product (Gupta et al. 1999). 
Hence, the network effects plays a critical role in the high definition home video industry 
between the actions of hardware firms and software firms, created by the direct dependence 
of consumer demand for the whole product on the action of hardware firms as well as 
software firms. This interdependence is illustrated in Figure 2. 
In history, the decisive factors in the VCR standards competition were a few. One of 
Sony’s mistakes was that it did not work hard enough to get more companies together in a 
‘family’ to support the Beta format (Morita 1986). On the other hand, JVC, in the number 
two position, did try harder and was more effective at forming alliances in support of VHS 
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(Morita 1986). Allowing partners to share in development also improved the VHS in ways 
that JVC might not have pursued itself. Sony has always been uniquely innovative with 
consumer products that incorporate advanced electronics. Therefore, it has never shipped its 
products to other companies for distribution under different labels, preferring to build up its 
name and reputation and to avoid sharing the benefits of its innovations with other 
distributors (Cusumano et al. 1992). Sony did realize that they would have to license the Beta 
format to ensure its widest distribution; however, it was unwilling to compromise on its 
standard or to help potential licensees with OEM shipments (Ohashi 2003). Sony’s 
reluctance in building VCRs for its licensees was clearly one of the major factors that 
contributed to losing the standards competition. On the contrary, in the high definition 
standards competition, Sony learned from the mistake and did work hard to form alliances in 
support of its technology-Blu-ray. Sony made Blu-ray alliance-player makers to pay fees to 
license Blu-ray technology. Similarly, Toshiba also made HD-DVD alliance-player makers 
to pay fees to license HD-DVD technology. Conversely to the VCR case, the movements by 
Sony and Toshiba facilitated a large production of both format players. 
In the high definition home video market, the world’s major player makers had joined 
either alliance by the beginning of 2004; however, Hollywood studios’ decision was more 
important in setting the standards for high definition. Table 5 in appendix C shows the 
market share of Hollywood studios’ market share by year. In 2004, the distribution of 
Hollywood studio’s support was evenly spread out between the two formats (HD-DVD 
supporters in bold).  The decision of the studios to support either format did not stay constant 
as it was easier for the studios to change manufacturing disc facilities to support a better 
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format, which they thought would bring a better profit for them rather than staying with one 
format. Consequently, the studios changed their decision back and forth a few times until the 
weight of market share went off balance in 2008. On January 4th, 2008 Warner Brothers 
announced that it would stop issuing HD-DVD movies in the coming months and this 
essentially signaled the end of the standards competition. Warner Brothers had the second 
largest market share in the movie industry. Its support only for Blu-ray meant significant for 
both manufacturers and consumers. Particularly, with Warner Brothers announcement 
consumers would have narrower choice of purchasing the movie software if they have HD-
DVD player instead of Blu-ray player. Also, only a few days after Warner Brothers 
announcement, Wal-Mart, the world’s largest retailer, announced that it would phase out 
HD-DVD off its selves. The day after Wal-Mart’s announcement, Toshiba halted production 
of HD-DVD and this ended the high definition standards competition. More detailed 
chronological announcements can be found in Appendix A.  
In the view of the fact that Toshiba—the HD-DVD technology leader—halted its 
production after its HD-DVD distributors and studios stopped supporting its technology, 
shows Toshiba’s failure of gaining indirect network effects. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the indirect network effects have played a critical role in the high definition standards 
competition. 
4.2.1 Model 
 This section proposes a model of demand for HD DVD players that can be used to for 
future empirical study of high definition home video market. The following model is adopted 
and incorporated from various sources (Berry 1994, Church et al. 2008, McFadden 1977) to 
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be used for high definition home video market empirical study. The model is not empirically 
tested because the necessary data are hard to obtain for the study period.  
As mentioned, indirect network effect depends on expectations of the number of 
available software supplied with hardware. In order to analyze the indirect network effects, 
finding the demand of the HD DVD players is important. The demand system is derived from 
a random-utility discrete choice model of consumer behavior. The utility of consumer  for 
product  depends on the characteristics of the product and the consumer: 
 ,  , ,  , !" 
where  ,  ,  and !"are observed product characteristics, unobserved product 
characteristics, and price and demand parameters, respectively (Berry 1994).  
In the model, the household is used as the purchasing entity. It is assumed that a 
household has a unit demand for a HD DVD player, that is, it buys either one HD DVD 
player or none at all. Each consumer is rational utility maximizer,  chooses product  if and 
only if  maximizes utility, 
 #ℎ%%&'&  ( ) ≥ )+ ,%- .. / ≠  
 
Let each consumer chooses  among +1, where +1 is the option of not purchasing a HD 
DVD player.   
) =  +1+
+
+ 3 +  + 4 
where ) is consumer ’s utility from consuming product  that belongs to format either Blu-
ray or HD-DVD. The kth component of this vector is denoted by + and 1+ is the mean level 
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of the taste parameter for component k. The vector  is product ’s observed attributes. Let 
be a real price, and stand for the mean of consumers’ valuations of an unobserved 
product characteristic such as product quality of HD DVD player brand j with 5
 = 0.  
Following Berry (1994), decompose ) into 4 and 7: 
7 =  +1+
+
+ 3 +  
It is common in traditional logit and probit models to assume that the variation in consumer 
tastes enters only through the additive term 4, which is assumed to be identically and 
independently distributed across consumers and choices. In the model with identically and 
independently distributed consumers tastes, only the mean utility levels, 7, differentiate the 
product.  Therefore, all properties of market demand, including market shares and elasticities, 
are determined solely by the 7 (Berry 1994). 
 
4.3 Hardware firms 
During a standards competition, it is interesting to analyze the behaviour not only of 
software firms (Hollywood studios) but also of hardware firms (manufacturer). Having 
bigger firms on one side of technology is a big advantage. The reason is that, the movement 
of bigger hardware firms to support one technology yields architectural innovation since they 
clearly have superior funds available compare to smaller firms to enhance the technology. 
Blu-ray and HD-DVD technologies are similar in function but they are technically 
different in regard to manufacturing processes. Hence, in order to take advantages of the new 
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technology that exists after the high definition standards competition, hardware firms had to 
make a huge commitment to investing in one technology. Initially, LG, Matsushita, Philips, 
Pioneer, Samsung, and Sony committed to Blu-ray, and Intel, Microsoft, NEC, and Toshiba 
committed to HD-DVD. Numerous factors are generally considered in order for a firm to 
make a commitment to one technology: the network of complement product firms, profit 
margin, investment cost, introduction date, storage capacity of a disc, etc. As noted in the 
earlier section, network effects play an important role in this aspect. Moreover, investment 
cost is an important factor for most of the hardware firms but especially for smaller firms. It 
is known that a DVD player or disc producing facility can be converted to an HD-DVD 
player or disc producing facility at much lower cost than a Blu-ray player or disc producing 
facility; hence, it is handsomely attractive to many hardware firms as well as to software 
firms. Lower investment cost can also easily reflect a higher profit margin. Although the 
facility converting cost is lower for HD-DVD, it is not the only important factor which will 
be used to decide make a commitment. There are many other factors, but they are weighted 
differently for hardware firms, and this is evident in the high definition standard war. Despite 
the fact that the cost of converting facility is lower for HD-DVD, most major hardware firms 
supported Blu-ray. One important factor of making decisions is the storage capacity of a disc, 
which can be learned from the history. The storage capacity of the medium played an 
important role in the winning of VHS in the U.S. home video market standards competition 
in the 1980s; hence it cannot be overlooked. Having a higher capacity disc enables software 
firms to contain a higher quality home video on disc, and provides some room for innovative 
software, not limiting to director or actor interview, undisclosed scene, etc. Therefore, this 
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could also be seen as a potential leading factor in the high definition standards competition, 
allowing the technology last longer. Appendix B compares specifications between Blu-ray 
and HD-DVD (DVD information is included for comparison purposes). 
Even after their commitment to one technology, it is sometimes seen that hardware 
firms switch their supporting technology to the other as soon as they find that their 
supporting technology is inferior to the other. The earlier they make a better decision, the 
better for the company in making profits in the future. Moreover, it is crucial to be on the 
right side before they invest more in building massive production facilities. 
During a standards competition, manufacturing firms risk the most in investing in one 
technology. However, manufacturing firms can gain substantial first mover advantages if 
they make the right strategic decision. Often it is considered as an irreversible investment. 
Several real options theories can be applied to determine the suitability of a firm’s 
investment. Traditional approach would be to determine whether the expected net present 
value (ENPV) exceeds zero. The traditional approach implicitly assumes that if the 
expenditures are irreversible; it cannot be delayed—if not undertaken now it cannot be 
undertake in the future. For example, ENPV of immediate investment can be calculated as 
below:  
 





where I is initial investment cost of setting up the high definition facility, P= is price 
of high definition player, and  i is risk-free rate. 
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In addition, with the facts mentioned in mind, firms can as well delay commitment in 
either technology if ENPV is negative, thereby reducing their risk in losing investment on 
one technology. On the other hand, firms can use hedging strategy. Two manufacturing 
firms, LG and Samsung, have developed a player which plays both Blu-ray and HD-DVD 
formats. This significantly reduced the risk of the firm being unable to switch to other 
technology when one technology wins. Also, the introduction of the player encouraged 
hesitant consumers to buy a high definition player. 
Toshiba’s recent financial report after losing in the standards competition shows the 
importance of winning the competition. Toshiba’s loss of the standards competition 
prevented the firm’s HD-DVD facilities from making profits for the firm. The loss left the 
firm with insufficient funds to invest in other future opportunities. 
 
4.4 Architectural Innovation 
Although, two other main theories can be applied to explain the results of the high 
definition standards competition, architectural innovation is not sufficient to explain the 
results of the high definition competition. Manufacturing firms are divided into Blu-ray and 
HD-DVD camps in the beginning stage and they co-operated within camp to enhance their 
technology. This significantly reduced the chance of architectural innovation to rise by an 
individual firm.  
In the first home video competition, manufacturers offered various new technologies, 
including wireless remote control, half-speed and one-third speed machines, multi-function 
machines (scan, slow, and still), high fidelity (hi-fi) sound to attract consumers (Cusumano et 
 
 39 
al. 1992). However, in the high definition home video competition, the technologies of both 
formats are superior, and ordinary consumers could not see the difference in quality or 
technological difference between Blu-ray and HD-DVD even though Blu-ray is technically a 
little bit better than HD-DVD; hence, it is hard to say that one technology is significantly 
superior to the other. Appendix B compares specifications between Blu-ray and HD-DVD 
(DVD information is included for comparison purposes). 
 
4.5 Patents 
Comparison between Blu-ray and HD-DVD can also be drawn from analyzing the 
patents information. Detailed patents data collection method is described in Appendix D. The 
author is not an expert in electric engineering field; hence, there is a slight chance that the 
data may have not been allocated to the right category. Cluster analysis is conducted to 
analyze if any pattern of filed patents contributed to the winning of Blu-ray in the high 
definition home video competition. It has been argued that the nature of technology is 
cumulative, so it is firm and country specific. Although both formats are considered to be 
superior, there is a possibility that hardware firms may prefer some specific technology over 
the other.  
The high definition home video industry is considered as a high-tech. Although, ordinary 
consumers will not notice much difference between the two formats, hardware firms may 
have different views. 
Patents’ reference cited information can be used to evaluate the possibility of 
hardware firms’ willingness to adopt one technology over the other. As mentioned, the two 
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formats are incompatible; hence the formats are based on two different technologies; 
otherwise there would be only one format. This fact designated most of the hardware firms to 
focus on one technology except for LG whom introduced a dual-format player in 2007. 
Patents references cited must be the ones that are related to either one technology and this is 
a good signal of which format was preferred for R&D by the hardware firms (If a Blu-ray 
related patent reference is cited, it would mostly benefit the enhancement of Blu-ray format 
and vice versa.).  
By observing the number of Blu-ray and HD-DVD related patents references cited 
there is a significant difference between the two formats. The comparison between the two 
formats is given in Table 5. Blu-ray related patents cited references 679 times in total 
whereas HD-DVD related patents cited references 232 times, which shows that many Blu-ray 
related patents tried to enhance its technology based on what exists for Blu-ray. Moreover, 
the average number of reference citation is 13.1 for Blu-ray and 12.6 for HD-DVD, showing 
that Blu-ray patents filed have much higher total number of patents references cited compare 
to HD-DVD but the average number of patents references cited is only differ by 0.5. There 
are 32 patents that cited Blu-ray related patents more than 50 times, and only 15 patents that 
cited HD-DVD related patents more than 50 times. One can induce that there would have 
been more R&D concentration on Blu-ray technology. 
Geographical proximity is important to the extent to which different lines of 
innovative activity influence one another, because of the existence of knowledge spillovers 
that are geographically bounded (Ketelhohn 2006).  Tables from 6 to 9 shows top 8 Blu-ray 
and HD-DVD patents filed by country and city accordingly. Top 3 by country shows that 
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Japan, Korea and U.S. are included for both formats. However, at city-level only Japan and 
Korea is included in Top 3 for both formats. Top 3 for Blu-ray represents 68% of total of top 
8 patents filed and 70% of total of top 8 patents filed for HD-DVD. Sony and Toshiba’s 
R&D center is located in Japan and the core technology for both format were invented in 
Japan, however it is interesting to note that Suwon-Si, Korea is heavily clustered (46%) for 
HD-DVD filed patents despite the fact of Toshiba’s R&D location. This indicates that 
considerably less HD-DVD R&D activities had happened from its origin compare to Blu-ray. 
It can be induced that Sony may have offered more incentives for followers in Japan, which 
may have resulted in knowledge spillovers to enhance the Blu-ray technology. 
Table 3 and 4 shows the number of patents filed by hardware firms by year. Blu-ray 
clearly has more patents filed between 2000 and 2007 compare to HD-DVD. Sony began 
licensing Blu-ray technology in early 2003 (detail discussed in section 3.2.1), and table 3 
shows the number of filed patents dramatically increased in the same year, which attracted 
many major hardware firms. It is unknown when HD-DVD licensing began during the study 
period, however it can be induced that HD-DVD licensing began after Blu-ray licensing 
started by looking at the fact that Toshiba showed HD-DVD prototype just before Blu-ray 
licensing has began. 
Table 10 and 11 shows the number of patents filed by U.S. Classification number.  For 
both formats’ patents, most of them are classified in U.S. Classification number 369. This 
number is classified for dynamic information storage or retrieval (United States Patent and 
Trademark Office 2008). Blu-ray related patents are filed more diversely compare to HD-
DVD. Blu-ray related filed patents are diversified into three groups for top 60% whereas 
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55% of HD-DVD related filed patent fall into only one class, showing that Blu-ray R&D 
activity is more diversified.   
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Chapter 5  Conclusion 
 
5.1 General 
Working around industry standards and complementary networks require much more 
than dealing with price and quality that were the primary elements in traditional generic 
competitive strategies (Porter 1980). Cusumano et al. (1992) showed how competitive 
strategies can control the dynamic power of the mass-consumer market to make a winner out 
of a second mover with extensive technological skills but a weak starting position in 
manufacturing and distribution capabilities by providing the VCR story. 
This paper presents an historical and theoretical analysis of the U.S. high definition 
home video industry. The history reveals changes of technologies, competitors, 
complementors, and firm strategies over a reasonably short period of time. The high 
definition home video industry as well as the home video game industry studied in Gallagher 
and Park (2002) offers much potential for theoretical development and validation of existing 
theoretical claims especially because of the existence of clear market leaders and followers, 
and its rapid technological change. 
The paper focused on important strategic issues: 
1) First-mover advantages 
2) Network effects 




The key finding in this study is that success in the high definition home video 
industry requires much more than just technological innovation or being a first-mover in the 
market. Technological innovation is essential and being a first-mover helpful, but not 
sufficient, toward building a dominant position in the market. Although, architectural 
innovation did not play a critical role in the competition, new technology innovation is 
always the key in setting a new standard format in a standard-based industry. Once a new 
format standards competition starts, the strategic focus shifts from technological innovation 
into traditional competitive strategies to build a network of complementary products and 
installed base. Historical evidences show that Sony created a winning alignment of Blu-ray 
producers from the beginning by the way its mangers conducted the formation of alliances, 
which differs from the first home video competition where Sony pressed commitment and 
reputation. This alliance brought huge added benefits in addition to the network alliance of 
complementary firms for Blu-ray. Consequently, an effective strategy to become a winner in 
the standards competition appears to be building a network of complementary products and 
subsequently installed base.  
As theories discussed in the paper suggest, the discussion partially support to 
traditional argument on first-mover advantages; they were important only to the point that 
first movers used their time to develop a network of complementary products. Therefore, this 
study evidently illustrates that building a network of complementary products and installed 
base should be the primary goal to compete in this type of industry. Also for R&D, network 
effects were important in gathering major hardware firms to invest in one technology. Sony 
began licensing Blu-ray technology earlier than HD-DVD, and the number of patents filed 
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for Blu-ray were clustered in its technology origin, Japan, rather than elsewhere, which may 
have been affected as an advantageous factor for Blu-ray technology with knowledge 
spillover. 
The final contest, the tipping of Warner Brothers decision provided direct evidence to 
draw conclusions about between and within standard competition. The alliances that Sony 
formed for production and distribution proved to be the decisive factors in the triumph of 
Blu-ray over HD-DVD.  
Finally, it is hoped that this historical and theoretical analysis will offer valuable 
insights to practicing managers. It is also worthwhile to note the research conducted by 
Gallagher and Park (2002) show that the firms with good understanding of prior history, 
change, and market development performed well in high technology industry  
 
5.2 Future Research 
Only few studies related to first-mover advantages, network effects, and architectural 
innovation have been done using data from other industries in international settings. More 
studies are needed to test the relevance of first-mover advantages, network effects, and 
architectural innovation results in different international locations and different industries. 
Also, empirical analysis of the high definition home video competition is needed when the 




Figure 1 A simple star network. Source: 
 
 
Figure 2 Market-Mediated Interdependence Between Manufacturers and Complementors in 










Row Labels Number of Patents 
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.  62 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.  56 
Sony Corporation  43 
LG Electronics Inc.  25 
Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V.  20 
Grand Total 206 
Table 1 Number of Blu-ray related patents filed by Top 5 firms 
 Row Labels Number of Patents 
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.  84 
LG Electronics Inc.  17 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.  15 
Target Technology Company, LLC  8 
General Electric Company  8 
Grand Total 132 
Table 2 Number of HD-DVD related patents filed by Top 5 firms 
Blu-ray 
Count of Number Column Labels 
Row Labels 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
N.V.  1 2 3 10 3 1 20 
LG Electronics Inc.  13 11 1 25 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.  1 20 23 4 8 56 
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.  16 14 12 13 6 61 
Sony Corporation  3 2 4 11 13 9 1 43 
Total 1 5 6 63 62 31 30 7 205 
Table 3 Top 5 firms which filed Blu-ray technology related patents by year 
 
HD-DVD 
Count of Filed Years 
Row Labels 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
General Electric Company  1 1 3 3 8 
LG Electronics Inc.  2 3 4 4 1 1 15 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 
Ltd.  1 2 2 2 3 1 3 14 
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.  14 12 11 10 11 5 11 5 79 
Target Technology Company, LLC  2 3 3 8 
Total 17 18 18 19 20 9 18 5 124 




  Total # Patents Ref Cited Avg # of Ref Cited # of Patents Ref > 50 times 
Blu-ray 679 13.1 32 
HD-DVD 232 12.6 15 




  Country # of Patents Filed Percentage Clustered 
JP 178 44% 
KR 90 22% 
US 75 19% 
NL 27 7% 
TW 19 5% 
FR 8 2% 
DE 6 1% 
HK 2 0% 
Grand Total 405 100% 




  Country # of Patents Filed Percentage Clustered 
KR 102 46% 
JP 53 24% 
US 49 22% 
TW 14 6% 
NL 2 1% 
FR 1 0% 
BM 1 0% 
BE 1 0% 
Grand Total 223 100% 










  City # of Patents Filed Percentage Clustered 
(Tokyo, JP) 94 29% 
(Suwon-si, KR) 64 20% 
(Osaka, JP) 58 18% 
(Eindhoven, NL) 27 8% 
(Seoul, KR) 26 8% 
(Hsin-Chu, TW) 17 5% 
(Irvine, CA) 8 3% 
(Kadoma, JP) 7 2% 
(Schenectady, NY) 6 2% 
(Yokohama, JP) 6 2% 
(Boulogne-Billancourt, FR) 6 2% 
Grand Total 319 100% 
















  City # of Patents Filed Percentage Clustered 
(Suwon-si, KR) 84 46% 
(Tokyo, JP) 26 14% 
(Seoul, KR) 18 10% 
(Osaka, JP) 17 9% 
(Irvine, CA) 11 6% 
(Hsin-Chu, TW) 10 5% 
(Niskayuna, NY) 5 3% 
(Kanagawa, JP) 3 2% 
(Milpitas, CA) 3 2% 
(Richmond, VA) 3 2% 
(Schenectady, NY) 3 2% 
Grand Total 183 100% 






  U.S. Classification # Count Percentage Clustered 
369 471 35% 
514 167 12% 
544 156 12% 
428 109 8% 
510 104 8% 
375 89 7% 
546 85 6% 
257 62 5% 
435 59 4% 
548 53 4% 
Grand Total 1355 100% 












  U.S. Classification # Count Percentage Clustered 
369 318 55% 
428 55 9% 
359 44 8% 
386 39 7% 
714 26 4% 
430 24 4% 
348 22 4% 
726 18 3% 
257 18 3% 
522 15 3% 
Grand Total 579 100% 






















































Appendix A: HD DVD Industry Chronology, 2000-2008 
Year Date Description 
2000 Oct. 05  Sony and Pioneer unveil DVR Blue at Japan's Ceatec show. The format would 
go on to form the basis for first-generation Blu-ray Disc BD-RE. 
  
Nov. 01  Sony announces the development of Ultra Density Optical (UDO), a blue-laser 
optical disc format proposed to replace magneto-optical discs. 
      
2002 Feb. 19  Led by Sony, nine of the world's largest electronics companies unveil plans for 
Blu-ray Disc. 
  
Aug. 29  Toshiba and NEC propose to the DVD Forum the next-generation optical disc 
format that will become HD DVD. 
  
Oct. 01  Prototypes of both formats are unveiled at Japan's Ceatec exhibition. Sony, 
Panasonic, Sharp, Pioneer and JVC showed prototype Blu-ray Disc recorders 
while Toshiba showed a prototype under the name Advanced Optical Disc 
(AOD). 
      
2003 Feb. 13  Licensing of Blu-ray Disc begins. Player makers pay US$20,000 to license Blu-
ray while the content-protection system license carries a $120,000 annual fee and 
additional charge of $0.10 per player. Media makers pay $8,000 annually and 
$0.02 per disc for the copy protection system. 
  
Apr. 07  Sony announces its Blu-ray Disc-based Professional Disc format for data 
archiving applications. 
  
Apr. 10  Sony puts on sale in Japan the world's first Blu-ray Disc recorder, the BDZ-S77. 
It's based on a 23G-byte cartridge version of the BD-RE disc and costs 450,000 
Yen (US$3,815 at the time). The machine and a later model from Panasonic lack 
support for prerecorded movies that will launch later and prove an expensive 
early step into next-generation video. 
  May. 28   Mitsubishi Electric joins the Blu-ray Disc group. 
      
2004 Jan. 07  Toshiba unveils its first prototype HD DVD player at CES. The player includes 
backwards compatibility with DVD. 
  Jan. 12 Hewlett-Packard and Dell put their support behind Blu-ray Disc. 
  
Jun. 10  The first commercial version of HD DVD-ROM is approved by the DVD 
Forum. 
  Sep. 21  Sony announces the PlayStation 3 will use Blu-ray Disc. 
  
Nov. 29  Paramount Pictures, Universal Pictures, Warner Bros. Pictures, HBO and New 
Line Cinema announce support for HD DVD. 
  Dec. 09  Disney announces support for Blu-ray Disc. 
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2005 Jan. 07  Backers of both formats promise players and movies in North America by the 
end of the year -- something that never materialized. 
  
Mar. 24  Talk and hope of a common format as Ryoji Chubachi, then Sony's president-
elect, says: "Listening to the voice of the consumers, having two rival formats is 
disappointing and we haven't totally given up on the possibility of integration or 
compromise." 
  
Apr. 21  Sony and Toshiba begin discussions on the possibility of a single format. The 
talks ultimately go nowhere. 
  
Aug. 18  Lions Gate Home Entertainment and Universal Music Group decide to back 
Blu-ray Disc. 
  Sep. 27  Microsoft Corp. and Intel Corp. put their weight behind HD DVD. 
  
Oct. 03  Paramount Home Entertainment says it will offer movies on both HD DVD and 
Blu-ray Disc. 
  
Dec. 16  Hewlett-Packard decides to drop exclusive support for Blu-ray Disc and back 
both formats. 
      
2006 Jan. 04  Bill Gates announces at CES that Microsoft will offer an add-on HD DVD drive 
for the Xbox 360 console. 
  
Mar. 10  Blu-ray Disc-supporter LG Electronics surprises the industry with news that it's 
developing an HD DVD drive. 
  
Mar. 31  Toshiba launches the world's first HD DVD player, the HD-XA1. It cost 
110,000 Yen (US$936 at the time) in Japan. 
  Nov. 11  Sony's PlayStation 3, which packs a Blu-ray Disc drive, goes on sale in Japan. 
  
Dec. 29  Hackers report success in breaking through part of the AACS copy protection 
that's on both HD DVD and Blu-ray Disc. 
      
2007 Jan. 07  Seeking to end the battle, LG Electronics unveils a dual-format player, while 
Warner Bros. shows a prototype disc that holds both an HD DVD and Blu-ray 
Disc layer so is compatible with players for both formats. 
  Apr. 17  Sales of HD DVD players in North America hit 100,000 since launch. 
  
Aug. 01  Microsoft cuts the price of its HD DVD player for the Xbox 360 from US$199 
to US$179 and starts offering five free movies. 
  
Aug. 20  Paramount and Dreamworks Animation both drop Blu-ray Disc in favor of HD 
DVD. 
  Sep. 13  Sony says it will use Blu-ray Disc in all high-def video recorders in Japan. 
  
Nov. 07  The price of Toshiba HD DVD players drops to US$100 with rebates as the 
holiday shopping season begins. 
  Nov. 11  Sony begins selling a lower cost version of the PlayStation 3. 
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2008 Jan. 04  Warner Bros. drops its bombshell: it will stop issuing HD DVD movies in the 
coming months and rely exclusively on Blu-ray Disc. In response the HD DVD 
Promotion Group cancels its CES news conference. 
  
Jan. 06  Akio Ozaka, head of Toshiba America Consumer Products, says at CES: "We 
remain firm in the belief that HD DVD is the format best suited to the wants and 
needs of consumers." In response Sony CEO Howard Stringer, with a grin on his 
face, says "All of us at Sony are feeling blue today." 
  
Jan. 14  Toshiba cuts the price of HD DVD players with the HD-A3 seeing a retail price 
of US$150. 
  Feb. 11  NetFlix and BestBuy say they will phase out HD DVD. 
  Feb. 15  Wal-Mart, the world's largest retailer, says it will phase out HD DVD by June. 
  
Feb. 16  Japanese public broadcaster NHK reports Toshiba has halted production of HD 
DVD players. Several additional local media reports confirm and The Nikkei 
business daily says Toshiba has decided to stop developing the format any 
further. 
 




Appendix B: Blu-ray and HD-DVD Comparision 




EDTV (480p) HDTV (720p, 1080i, 
1080p) 





via component video 
EDTV (480p) EDTV+ (960x540) EDTV+ (960x540) 
Disc capacity 4.7GB (single layer) 15GB (single layer) 25GB (single layer) 
8.5GB (dual layer) 30GB (dual layer) 50GB (dual layer) 
  51GB (prototype triple 
layer) 
100GB (prototype quad 
layer) 
Video capacity (per 
dual-layer disc) 
SD: approximately 3 
hours 
SD: approximately 13 
hours 
SD: approximately 23 
hours 
HD: n/a HD: 5.1 or 3.3 hours, 
depending on encoding 
method 
HD: 8.5 or 5.6 hours, 
depending on encoding 
method 
Audio soundtracks3 Dolby Digital EX, 
DTS-ES 
Uncompressed linear 
PCM, Dolby TrueHD, 
DTS-HD Master Audio, 





PCM, Dolby TrueHD, 
DTS-HD Master Audio, 















All Microsoft, Intel, HP, 
NEC, Toshiba 
Apple, Dell, BenQ, HP, 





Studio support All Paramount, Studio 
Canal, Universal, 
Warner (until end of 










Warner, Lions Gate 
Compatible video game 
consoles 
PlayStation 2, 
PlayStation 3, Xbox, 
Xbox 360  
Xbox 360 (via external 
HD DVD accessory, 
sold separately) 
PlayStation 3 
Player prices $99 and less $130 (Xbox 360 
accessory); $150 and 
more (stand-alone 
players); $999 for 
combo player 
$399 (PlayStation 3); 
$499 and more (stand-
alone players); $999 for 
combo player 
Movie prices $6 and more (retail) $20 to $28 (retail) $20 to $28 (retail) 
Number of titles 
available at the end of 
2007 
50,000-plus about 330 about 360 
Players are backward 
compatible with 
existing DVD videos 
Yes Yes Yes 
Set-top recorders 
available now 
Yes No No 
"Managed copy" option No Yes Yes 
Copy protection/digital 
rights management6 
Macrovision, CSS AACS, ICT AACS, ICT, BD+, BD-
ROM Mark 
Region-coded discs and 
players 
Yes No (currently; could 
change in future) 
Yes 
 








Appendix C: Market Share of Major Distributors
Distributor 2000 
Paramount 
Pictures  10.57% 11.00%
Warner Bros.  11.45% 14.85%
Buena Vista  14.94% 10.93%
Universal  14.62% 11.48%
Sony Pictures  11.69% 8.87%
20th Century Fox  9.82% 10.55%
New Line  5.03% 7.15%
Other 21.88% 25.17%
Total 100% 
Table 12 Top 7 Hollywood studio market share by year
Figure 6 Market Share by year. Source: 
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 7.46% 7.09% 6.73% 9.28% 10.21%
 11.70% 12.60% 13.16% 16.26% 12.70%
 12.78% 16.76% 12.47% 10.38% 16.00%
 9.74% 11.78% 9.77% 11.20% 8.69%
 16.80% 12.84% 14.27% 8.53% 16.69%
 10.69% 8.88% 9.87% 15.27% 14.99%
 9.77% 10.04% 4.25% 4.72% 2.71%
 21.06% 20.01% 29.48% 24.36% 18.01%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
  
 














Appendix D: Patents Data Collection 
Data Collection Method 
Patent data used in this study were extracted from the U.S. patent and trademark office 
webpage, a federal agency in the department of commerce which has promoted the progress 
of science for over 200 years. The patent data available on the website mostly contains 
detailed technological information which only engineers in the patents related field will 
understand. The website provides sufficient technological and performance specifications of 
each patent developed by each assignees. Moreover, it also contains some straightforward, 
helpful information for the purpose of this study. The necessary study data were extracted 
using three fields - title, abstract, and description - available from the advanced patent search 
query webpage. Typically, Blu-ray technology is classed under five main patent names, 
representing its evolution: Blu-ray, BD-RE, UDO, BDZ and dvr-blue. Patent data were 
extracted if any of the five names of Blu-ray were included in the three fields mentioned 
above (Table 1). It is a remarkably complete patent data set for the industry-not a sample of 
firms, but complete high definition home video market patent information. HD-DVD is 
primarily known by two different names: HD-DVD and AOD. Similarly, the same methods 






((TTL/((((blu-ray OR bd-re) OR udo) OR 
bdz) OR dvr-blue) OR ABST/((((blu-ray OR 
bd-re) OR udo) OR bdz) OR dvr-blue)) OR 
SPEC/((((blu-ray OR bd-re) OR udo) OR 
bdz) OR dvr-blue) 
((TTL/(AOD OR hd-dvd) OR ABST/( AOD 
OR hd-dvd)) OR SPEC/hd-dvd) 
 
Table 13 Search Queries 
 
Data Clean-up Method 
Blu-ray patent terms, such as UDO (Ultra Density Optical) and BDZ, have applications in 
areas other than Blu-ray. For instance, Udo is a person’s name in German, a type of plant, it 
also can stand for User Device Operation. Likewise, BDZ can mean an abbreviation for 
benzodiazepines in chemistry, or it can be used in Finance as differentials.  
Similarly, the HD-DVD term, AOD (Advanced Optical Disc) has meanings other 
than HD-DVD. Specifically, AOD is an abbreviation for Argon Oxygen Decarburization in 
chemistry. Subsequently, any patents unrelated to HD-DVD per se were removed. Since Blu-
ray is a subset of the HD-DVD term, some patent data extracted for HD-DVD included Blu-
ray in the patent information; hence, patents with the Blu-ray term in title or abstract were 
queried, manually inspected, and removed if they did not satisfy the criteria. Ultimately, the 
entire patents data set used for study was individually inspected for inclusion. Inspecting the 
title and abstract of each patent allowed irrelevant Blu-ray or HD-DVD patent data collected 
to be removed. Where patent data was insufficient to determine eligibility, claim and 
description of the patent were followed-up.   
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Since there was no extant of a technical expert with both Blu-ray and HD-DVD 
knowledge in the study,  if the inspected patent data included any of the following terms, 
then they were included: data, optical, medium, conductor, motion picture, signal, music, 
video. Otherwise, data were removed. 
Patents that were included in both Blu-ray and HD-DVD were re-inspected for 
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